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 Biblical Terrorism: With a Platonic Deconstruction 
 
From the point of view of philosophical analysis, there are initial obstacles to any 
discussion of terrorism, caused by the rather wide and liberal use of the term, "terrorist" 
in our day.  Israeli government officials, for example, prior to recent peace accords, 
characteristically referred to members of the PLO as "terrorists," in spite of long-
standing indications that the PLO had renounced terrorism. And an example closer to 
home: "pro-choice" advocates in the U.S. speak of "pro-life" protesters (not the ones 
who advocate assassinating abortionists) who block the entrances of abortion clinics as 
"terrorists" -- which is at least a species of linguistic overkill. "Terrorism" was originally a 
French term referring to the activities of extermination or banishment perpetrated by the 
Revolutionary Government in France during the 1790s. Current usage builds on that 
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meaning, as is illustrated in the  Encyclopedia Britannica’s definition of terrorism as “the 
systematic use of terror or unpredictable violence against governments, publics, or 
individuals to attain a political objective.”   
When we speak of terrorism in the strict and most prevalent sense,, we have in 
mind a species of violent action which goes uniquely against standard conventions 
(even conventions of war) and morals; but with a strategic aim in view (in other words, it 
is not the sort of random violence perpetrated by a madman who runs into the streets 
and begins shooting at anyone and everyone); and it often draws justification from some 
ideal, religious and/or political, that is so overarchingly important that it justifies the 
suspension of all conflicting moral norms and becomes itself a paramount norm, so that 
at times indiscriminate killing is “justified” in terms of the attainment of some 
transcendental or higher good. Religious ideology is a common incentive to terrorism:  
Bruce Hoffman estimates that about 25% of the terrorist groups presently operative are 
religiously motivated.1 
 But it is so common in our day to discuss terrorism in conjunction with acts or 
movements of the Palestinian Intifada, or Shiite and Sunni groups such as the 
Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad, that there is a danger of inculcating a stereotype 
of the religiously oriented terrorist as a Muslim, or at least outside the pale of what we 
consider to be "Western" civilization.  So we need to be reminded that “Western” 
civilization, permeated as it has been with the constantly metamorphosing and broadly 
reinterpreted "Judaeo-Christian tradition," has had a tradition of religiously inspired 
                                                 
1Bruce Hoffman, “Holy Terror”: The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious 
Imperative (Santa Monica: Rand, 1993), p. 2. 
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terrorism noteworthy in its own right:  With regard  to Judaism, one thinks of the 
assassination of Roman occupiers by the Zealots and, in more recent times, the 
repeated violent attacks on the Islamic Noble Sanctuary by Israeli fanatics since the 
seventies, the 1984 "Temple Mount" plot of the Gush Emunim, and the February 1994 
massacre of Muslims in Abraham’s Mosque in Hebron by an orthodox Jewish settler 
affiliated with the Rabbi Meir Kahane’s radical Kach movement; in Christianity, we find 
food for thought in the exploits of the medieval Peoples' Crusades, the Anabaptists and 
Taborites, the Adamites and Tafurs, up to and including contemporary right-wing groups 
such as the "Order" and the "Covenant," and both Protestant and Catholic terrorist 
groups in Ireland, not to mention the recent “ethnic cleansing” of Moslem populations by 
Bosnian Serbs. 
 Are such phenomena coincidental to religion or in some way connected with 
religious commitments?  Unfortunately, some impressive prima facie examples of what 
we would now call terrorism are to be found in the Old Testament chronicles of the 
ancient Hebrews, books held sacred and exemplary by Christians and Jews, and one of 
the most influential sources for what are very loosely called "Judaeo-Christian" values.  
To delve once again into some of these biblical narratives of violence is to plumb the 
depths of the collective unconscious of Western civilization.  But the purpose of such an 
examination is not just catharsis and intensified self-understanding. It is also an 
endeavor to return to a perennial philosophical problem broached by Plato -- the 
problem of the moral influence of literature -- but requiring some special application in 
the Judaeo-Christian context . 
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Plato’s Censure of Poetry, Revisited 
 
To talk about literature’s moral influence as a "philosophical problem" in Plato is 
an understatement.   For in a very real sense Plato's well-known questioning of the 
moral influence of the poets in the Republic is the origin of Western philosophy, with all 
its sets and subsets of problems, as as a distinct discipline.  For far from merely 
suggesting institutionalized censorship as a desirable accouterment for the ideal polity, 
Plato was defining the place and function of the philosopher as one who is vocationally 
and dispositionally at odds with the poet; as one who relies on methodically-applied 
reason to arrive at truth about human affairs, unlike the poets, who manipulate the 
emotions, deal in fantasy, and are by vocation outside the proper parameters of truth-
seeking. 
Granted that this sort of thinking is also the source of the traditional dichotomy 
between philosophy and literature, truth and fiction, reason and rhetoric -- a disjunction 
of which both philosophers and literati are perhaps unjustifiably proud; granted that it 
raises the specter of moral censorship of literature, especially in the context of Plato's 
authoritarian-elitist ideal "republic"; granted that contemporary Western philosophers, 
although still by and large in the service of the "truth" and sensing a certain superiority 
of their enterprise over things like fiction-writing, are nevertheless sufficiently influenced 
by post-Enlightenment liberalism to eschew anything that smacks of censorship.  Still, 
Plato's problematic goes beyond narrow questions about censorship and state control, 
and is very relevant to an equally pressing problematic concerning the place of the Bible 
in contemporary Western culture. 
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 Why did Plato through the instrumentality of Socrates in Books II and III of the 
Republic (391-397) seriously suggest restricting the reading of the works of Homer and 
Hesiod and other poets -- works which we consider great and lasting classics of 
Western culture?  First of all, it is clear that Plato was not troubled about the effect the 
reading of such works might have on himself and on other mature thinkers; his concern 
rather is the effect of many of the stories and the presentations of myth on 
impressionable youth.  There is an element of elitism, in this, of course; but we have to 
keep in mind that poetry and drama in Plato's time was not just storytelling, but morality 
plays grounded in Greek religion depicting and extolling or devaluing ways of life.  In a 
society in which art and religion were so closely intertwined, the poet exercised a 
religious function, somewhat akin to a priest or prophet.  
 Plato in Book X (598-647) of the Republic goes even beyond the strictures of 
Book III concerning suitable reading matter for the young, and recommends the 
banishment of poets from his ideal city, not only because they produce tantalizing 
depictions of duplicitous characters like Achilles who function as major role-models for 
the more impressionable citizens, but also because as a philosopher he was convinced 
that reason rather than admixtures of popular mythology and religion should be taken as 
a standard for behavior.  Although the Republic is not an ethics per se, it is the 
foundational impetus to ethics, where the philosopher stakes his claim to having a new 
and more important gauge to substitute for the iffy and ambiguous gauges of the poets.  
It is also a claim, which we do well to understand, that in some important sense moral 
philosophy as a preeminently rational enterprise is to take priority over religion. 
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 This latter claim comes out more explicitly in Plato's Euthyphro:  This dialogue 
debates, among other things, the question whether something is right because it is 
pleasing to God, or pleasing to God because it is morally right. The selfsame question 
has of course been with us down through the centuries, and becomes particularly 
pressing whenever we are confronted with individuals or groups who claim divine 
inspiration or directives for actions which flout our own moral standards.  Plato tended 
towards an emphasis on the primacy of the moral: only that which is moral could and 
should be pleasing to God (or the gods).  But the  specific question of duty that gave 
rise to his analysis (Euthyphro's purported duty of turning in one's father for apparently 
criminal neglect of a servant) was sufficiently morally ambiguous to leave us with doubts 
about whether such problems might be more satisfactorily solved by appealing to 
religious traditions or inspiration.  If, however, Euthyphro had been divinely inspired to 
kill his father in retribution, one may easily surmise that Plato would have come down 
firmly in favor of replacing such religious enthusiasm with ethical restraint. 
 In what follows I will argue that the positions taken by Plato  in the persona of 
Socrates in Republic  II, III, and X, and the Euthyphro are not just interesting albeit 
dated reactions of Plato to some developments in his own time, but are quite relevant 
to, and even more pressing in, our own time, with respect to Old Testament narratives 
of what we would now characterize as "terrorist" activities, and the potential religious 
inspiration derived therefrom. We philosophers, and intellectuals in general, are able to 
take such narratives by and large with the appropriate "grain of salt"; but we, like Plato, 
are not concerned about possible influence on ourselves.  We may be concerned, 
however, about the potential influence on the vast numbers of laymen and clergymen 
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who accept the Bible in a rather literal and historical sense as the "word of God," and 
derive religious/moral inspiration therefrom.   ISSUES OF INTERPRETATION 
 
 Although we may wish to avoid the elitism of Plato and his guardians, it turns out 
that there indeed exists in our own midst a rather two-tiered approach to interpretation 
of the "prima facie" incitements to terrorism in the Old Testament.  Many scripture 
scholars maintain that most of what appear to be accounts of terrorist atrocities on the 
part of the Israelites is simply the result of the buildup of legends about religious heroes 
by later writers -- not strictly fabrications, but boastful exaggerations meant to bolster 
the self-perceptions of the devotees of Yahweh.  This of course is not a very satisfactory 
explanation for the believer who looks to the canonical Scriptures for the salvific "word 
of God."  And since a belief in the intervention of God in human history is certainly a 
keynote and perhaps a defining characteristic of the Judaeo-Christian tradition, one 
wonders how much nonhistoricity is compatible with this tradition itself.  If, for example, 
Abraham never existed, as some scripture scholars assert, and Moses never received 
the Ten Commandments from God, and Joshua never really carried out all those 
expeditions in Canaan, etc., etc. -- the Jew or Christian whose faith is by definition 
historically oriented may perceive the foundations of faith pulled out from beneath him 
or her. 
 But let us suppose that the scripture scholars are correct, and that most or even 
all of the narratives in the Old Testament are mythic expressions of a subjective faith: 
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still, as meaningful myths, all the more do the accounts in question encapsulate values 
which without doubt influence the thinking and ideals even of  theologically informed 
religious persons who take their historicity with a "grain of salt" but do not have enough 
"grains of salt" to cover all the mythically encapsulated values they are confronted with.  
We may assume that there are a large number of people who, due to enlightened faith 
or religious apathy, are not in such a situation; but there are also presumably many who 
are.  It is of course with these latter groups in mind that I proceed in my analysis.  
After discussing the origins of prima facie terrorism in the Old Testament, and the 
constellation of values connected with this phenomenon, I will consider some present 
implications and applications, and suggest a solution that will draw some inspiration 
from Plato's twofold problematic mentioned above. PROFILE OF OLD TESTAMENT TERRORISM 
  
As we shall see, some types of violence countenanced in the Old Testament, 
while differing in some important respects from modern terrorism, also bear significant 
similarities, especially on the ideological plane, to many forms of modern terrorism. 
 Old Testament terrorism is best understood in the context of two important 
ambiguities:  
 There existed first of all a tremendous ambiguity in regard to the attitude of 
Yahweh-God towards non-Hebrews.  On the one hand, a) Yahweh's promises of 
territory and settlements to the Hebrews are accompanied by exhortations to live in 
peaceful coexistence with outsiders or foreigners:  "You shall not molest or oppress an 
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alien" (Exodus 22:20, 23:9); but b) in scriptural accounts the possession of territory by 
the Israelites is accompanied as a matter of course by massive, and purportedly 
divinely-ordained, dispossessions of aliens: as Jehoshaphat puts it in his naive and 
uncomprehending prayer concerning the resistance from the  Ammonites and the 
Moabites to Israelite occupation of land, "Are you not our God, you who have 
dispossessed the inhabitants of this land for Israel your people?...  Will you our God not 
execute judgement on them, since we are helpless against this vast horde attacking 
us?" (II Chronicles 20:7).  From the viewpoint of the non-Hebrews, of course, these 
attacks were defensive acts to prevent expropriation of their lands!  
 There is an equally important ambiguity with regard to the projected violent or 
nonviolent propensities of God:  a) On the one hand, we seem to find an absolute 
rejection of indiscriminate  violence implied when Abraham, looking over the doomed 
Sodom, whose inhabitants he hopes to save, says to God: "Far be it from you to do 
such a thing, to make the innocent die with the guilty, so that the innocent and the guilty 
would be treated alike!  Should not the judge of all the world act with justice?" (Genesis 
18:25)  Then God, responding to Abraham's plea, facilitates the escape of a handful of 
innocent people, before the destruction of Sodom.  But b) this is the same God who is 
credited for slaying the firstborn children of the Egyptians, many of whom were 
presumably innocent, in Exodus 12, and the same God who, according to scriptural 
accounts concerning Moses, commanded dispossession of inhabitants to make way for 
the Israelites (Numbers 33:55-56), and devised the "ban" (harem) -- a "scorched earth" 
policy which was supposed to involve the complete slaughter of men, women and 
children, and sometimes even animals, for the Hittites, Girgashites, Amorites, 
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Canaanites, Perizzites, Hivites, Jebusites, and others (Deuteronomy 3:2, 7:2-5, 20:16; 
Numbers 2:34, 3:3; Joshua 6:21, 8:26-28, 11;:20; see also I Samuel 15:3, 28:18; II 
Samuel 21).  (One partial exception was the destruction of the Midianites, since the 
lives of "virgins" were spared as a concession to the desires of Moses' soldiers 
[Numbers 31:17-31]).  God's wrath was not just reserved for foreigners, however. In a 
number of instances God is said to have exterminated or threatened to exterminate, 
heretical or recalcitrant Israelites (Exodus 33: 3, 5; Deuteronomy 13:13; Numbers 
16:25ff; II Kings 9:6-7, 10:30; Ezekiel 21:6-10, 23:47). 
 Joshua, following Moses' lead, is reported to have successfully implemented the 
divine total-extermination "ban" against 31 cities.  If we were to take seriously some of 
the Biblical campaign reports, apparently hundreds of thousands of inhabitants were 
slaughtered indiscriminately (see e.g. Joshua 6:21, 8:24-25, 10, 11, 12).  Perhaps as an 
offshoot of such ambiguities, many similar examples of what we would now call 
"atrocities,” “massacres,” or "terrorism" could be brought forward from the Old 
Testament.  In the beginning they were perpetrated under the rubric of a divine 
injunction; but often presented later under the rubric of military strategy or power plays.  
We read, for example, that David, while under the protection of King Achish, secretly 
conducted raids on the tribes allied with Achish; and later returned to slaughter all 
inhabitants to keep them from informing the king (I Samuel 27:9,11).  (The importance 
of what translation is used is exemplified by another Davidic incident:  In some 
translations (e.g. the Vulgate, King James, and Douay bibles, we find in II Samuel 12:31 
that "David...bringing forth the people...,  sawed them, and drove over them chariots 
armed with iron: and divided them with knives, and made them pass through brick-kilns.  
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So did he to all the cities of the children of Ammon."  In the New American bible and 
other contemporary translations the same passage reads:  "He...led away the 
inhabitants, whom he assigned to work with saws, iron picks, and iron axes, or put to 
work at the  brickmold.  This is what he did to all the Ammonite cities"!)  
 Accounts of some apparently sadistic implementations of the "ban" are also 
found in later Hebrew chronicles (see e.g. I Maccabees 5:5). CONTRIBUTORY CAUSES AND ASSOCIATED VALUES 
 
 Doubtlessly -- as is the case with the history of slavery -- one would have to 
consider the moral values implicit in such accounts with judicious qualifiers concerning 
the relative state of moral consciousness reached in the past, so that moral standards 
widely accepted today will not be simplistically applied to very different historical 
contexts.  The Hebrews considered themselves to be the champions of the worship of 
the true God in an era dominated by polytheistic and demonic idolatry; claimed territorial 
rights, which they thought to be guaranteed by God, in a context of what we would call 
"lawless" regional competition for power and  possession; and eventually came to feel 
that it was imperative to avoid compromising their theocratic culture and values by any 
type of close and habitual association with foreigners.  How else could they maintain the 
tribal and religious purity on which their salvation as a people depended, than by using 
extreme measures?  Would we act any differently?  
Nevertheless it is possibly important for all, especially in our nuclear era, to avoid 
bringing about a similar conjunction of inciting conditions; so an understanding of these 
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conditions is incumbent on us.  Four important contributory factors for such terroristic 
species of violence in the Old Testament can be differentiated; and these factors, as we 
shall see, seem to be also of the utmost relevance to many contemporary instances and 
types of terrorism:  
 1) Ambiguity in the concept of God: In seeing a religious people rallying under 
the banner of their God to adopt what we would now call terroristic or even genocidal 
values, one comes face-to-face with the awful importance of the precise characteristics 
attributed to their God by religious devotees, and also with the possible modifications 
that believers may make in the overall concept of the divinity.  Inconsistencies leap out 
at us.  Yahweh the warrior God is described rather uniformly as adamantly opposed to 
the practices of child sacrifice among idolaters, and yet is represented as ordering the 
slaughter of the children of idolaters as well as their mothers and fathers, by the 
Hebrews!  Yahweh is represented as slaughtering the children of the Egyptians in order 
to make the exodus of the Israelites possible, and yet the Hebrews also attribute perfidy 
to the enemies of Israel because they "oppress (Yahweh's) hereditary people, 
murdering and massacring widows, orphans and guests" (Psalm 94:6).  Finally, God is 
described as slaughtering the Hebrews themselves on occasions when they stray from 
the law, but also is characterized numerous times as a kind, patient and gentle father, 
loving his people with a passion, although complaining bitterly when he is not given 
signs of affection and respect. (Granted, the apparently contradictory characterizations 
sometimes appear in passages widely separated as regards the time of the writing, 
and/or the time depicted; but the believer does not approach Scripture as an historian or 
scholar, and does not make the fine distinctions that the latter might make.) 
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 In regard to such ambiguity and ambivalence, one is impressed by the very 
human tendency to attribute our own objectives, motivations and actions to a divinity; 
the idea of God is admittedly one which has required and undergone much refinement 
from primitive times.  The very existence of contradictory aspects in God is an indicator 
that the idea of the divinity is still inchoate, in development, in need of refinement.  But it 
is a basic axiom in logic that "a contradiction can prove anything" -- if there is a 
contradiction in any place in our deductions, any arbitrary conclusion can be drawn.  
And similarly in religion, an ambiguous or contradictory concept of God can support and 
justify any kind of response.  This is an inherent danger in all religion, and the reason 
some have even decided that all religion is pernicious.  Unless we presume that a 
clearer, more consistent, and certainly noncontradictory concept of God is also 
attainable, we must join the skeptics in warning against, and guarding against, religion, 
because of the extremes to which it will inevitably lead under duress. 
 2) "Chosenness," and the covenant:  The Israelites were assured in the Old 
Testament, through covenants ratified successively through Abraham (Genesis 17:4-7), 
Isaac (Genesis 17:21) and David (Isaiah 55:3, Jeremiah 33:17) that they were to be 
granted certain special rights and privileges.  In exchange, obedience and loyalty to 
Yahweh, and extremely high standards of behavior, were expected for the Israelites 
(Exodus 24:1-18).  God, as possessor of all the earth, as one party to the covenant, 
gives the Israelites rights to broad expanses of rich territory -- rights which function like 
a title to "eminent domain" over the property of others, even of actual, legitimate 
inhabitants.  Rights of special protection from enemies, of prosperity, and of fruitfulness 
of progeny, are also written into the covenant. 
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 Needless to say, an entire people begins to think of itself as especially gifted and 
favored, the chosen vessels for God's rule over the whole world (see e.g. Psalms 47, 
105, 110), free from laws not enunciated by Yahweh, not bound by their own intra tribal 
norms of morality when dealing with religious/ethnic outsiders, not responsible for the 
fate of those who because of commitment to false gods and moral turpitude are not 
included in the covenant as God's "hereditary people." 
Variations on the idea of "chosenness" have of course survived into the twentieth 
century -- the Russian orthodox claim of being the "third Rome," the American 
conception of "manifest destiny" which prevailed in the nineteenth century, Roman 
Catholic insistence over the centuries on the formula, "outside the Church no salvation" 
up to the time of the Second Vatican Council, the Zionist vision of Jewish settlements on 
the West Bank as a fulfillment of biblical prophecies, the Boer doctrine of the 
prerogatives and precedence of Christian whites in South Africa, and the Mormon claim 
of reestablishing the "lost tribes of Israel" in America.   The idea of "chosenness" is a 
powerful religious concept which leads in its more shadowy ramifications to Herculean 
efforts to maintain doctrinal and dispensational purity, self-enforced isolation, and when 
necessary, agonized combat against those who threaten, or seem to threaten, the 
spiritual cohesiveness of the chosen.  Thus when conflicting claims between the chosen 
and the nonchosen develop, as between the ancient Israelites and the Canaanites, or 
modern Zionists and Palestinians, or Sikh or Muslim Minorities and the Hindu majority in 
India, those who believe in divine election are almost bound in extreme circumstances 
to assert their rights by force, in opposition to claims in deference to which there can be 
no negotiation.  For God has spoken. 
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 Special problems develop, of course, if and when those whose faith assures 
them that they are "chosen" encounter enemies with vastly superior military might and 
organizational stability.  In such cases terrorism may be the "court of last resort," since 
such enemies (who are also perceived as the enemies of God), it may be argued, must 
be stopped at any cost from preventing the accomplishment of the absolute purposes of 
God on earth. 
 3) The Need for Deterrence through Fear: Religious considerations aside, once 
a people decides to use force to fend off threats, and in particular continual threats and 
habitual threats, posed by a superior power -- the special value of fear and terror cannot 
be ignored.  The ostensibly positive attitude towards real or mythologized terrorist 
strategies by the ancient Hebrews was instigated primarily by situations in which the 
"chosen people," surrounded on every side by threats to their existence and/or to their 
faith or religious discipline, decided that military prowess was not enough.  In order to 
be victorious, the Hebrews, seeming to be outnumbered by, or vastly weaker in  
weaponry than, their enemy, edged (whether really or in wishful thinking) toward an 
alternative strategy (which they were not the first to adopt) open to them: to strike such 
unspeakable terror in the minds of enemies that the enemies would not even consider 
attacking; to be so merciless that the enemy and their progeny would tremble before the 
legendary force and brutality of God's chosen earthly instruments.  Once in vogue, this 
legend could be a kind of moral “insurance policy” against further attacks and 
challenges.  And insofar as sheer population density of one people over against another 
was an important factor in eventual victory, the slaughter of women and children would 
not really be "indiscriminate" (so the reasoning goes), but a quite discriminate 
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judgement against the continued generational growth of a people whose ancestors 
would presumably continue to threaten the chosen people, just as their forebears had 
done. 
 4) The Arduous Demands of Confessional Purity: To remain "a people apart", 
dedicated to Yahweh, uncontaminated -- in doctrine, ritual, and dietary laws -- by the 
wide and wild variety of practices and ideas rampant among their neighbors, was no 
mean task for the Hebrews.  While some economic interchange might be innocuous, 
social commerce and intermarriage were eventually considered grave threats to 
solidarity and fidelity.  The written and unwritten proscriptions against consorting with 
foreigners inevitably inculcated a situational exclusiveness.  Strategically, it seems that 
the paucity of foreigners living among the Israelites in many stages of their development 
was a military handicap, since any enemy bent on exterminating the Israelites as a 
people would have no difficulty separating them out from others among whom they were 
distributed; they were, so to speak, "sitting ducks," highly visible, who could be easily 
spotted, surrounded and attacked.  How could one maintain security in such a situation?  
Preemptive strikes and what would now be called systematic genocidal diminution of 
surrounding populations was a strategy that could not help but suggest itself to the mind 
of a patriot.  The foreigners who would dare to infiltrate, on an equal footing, the life and 
culture and politics of this proprietary people of Yahweh would experience such wrath 
and terror that a natural counterbalance would arise to the military advantage the 
foreigners would  otherwise possess from their easy-targeting capabilities. 
 To generalize from the chronicles of the Hebrews:  We see them as a people apt 
to resort to terrorism after being consolidated and confirmed by a religious heritage 
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which singles them out for special privileges in return for extremely exacting 
responsibilities to their deity; and which, caught up in temporary but prolonged threats to 
their survival as a distinct people with uncompromisible traditions, gravitated towards 
strategies, purportedly implemented, which we would now call "terroristic".  These 
strategies can be characterized as a species of "overkill" designed to inculcate 
absolutely disabling fear in any potential attacker or conqueror, as well as to implement 
what we would call now long-range "genocidal" objectives, calculated to inhibit the 
growth of a particular population to unconscionable numerical superiority. 
Noticeable in the terrorist mentality is a feeling of religious superiority, or 
"chosenness," accompanied with an ambiguity regarding the way in which the 
religiously privileged status is to be manifested in this present politico-social world; there 
is also a strong sentiment for the necessity of maintaining intra communal or 
confessional solidarity, for warding off intrusion from nonmembers, and occasionally for 
giving demonstrations of violence so definitive or brutal that it might serve as a deterrent 
to aggression from the uncomfortably vast numbers of hostile populations in their ambit. 
 Although the focus in this essay is on terror in the "Judaeo-Christian" tradition, it 
is possible that the terror attributed to Palestinian or Iranian groups in our day may be 
conceived as part of this same tradition, at least if we take into account long-standing 
Islamic traditions.  For, as is well-known, Muslim traditions include claims of descent 
from Ishmael, Abraham's son, and rightful entitlement to the promises made to all the 
descendants of Abraham in the initial covenant [see Genesis 17:4-7; the Koran 2:119-
141].  Thus, from the fundamentalist Islamic point of view, the ancient struggle for rights 
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to divine inheritance between Ishmael and Isaac, is still going on, with themselves as 
major claimants unjustly deprived of their covenantal heritage. 
 And if, as some scripture scholars assert, Islam is the cultural heir of the 
Christian Monophysite heresy which spread in the early middle ages to Egypt, the 
connection with the Judaeo-Christian tradition would be even closer. TOWARDS A SOLUTION 
  
If we confine our attention to the religiously-motivated terrorism exemplified in the 
Old Testament, omitting consideration of terrorism in its wider ambit or its analogous 
senses, we find that certain approaches to the solution of terrorism suggest themselves 
from a further analysis of the four factors associated with it.  The emphasis here must of 
course be on long-range axiological solutions rather than on practical tactics or political 
strategies: 
 1) Ethical Reevaluation of Religious Concepts:  To someone who believes, like 
the Christian existentialist Søren Kierkegaard, that the religious sphere has an absolute 
and unquestionable priority over the ethical, the suggestion that the religious should be 
subject to ethical evaluation seems to verge on the blasphemous.  Here some all-
important interpretative principles come into play:  It is one thing to hold that the 
religious should be superior to the ethical in some respects, or with regard to certain 
areas of discourse, but quite another to hold that the religious must always hold 
precedence.  This latter position seems to entail, for example, that the concept of God 
has not undergone any evolution from past eras, such that an ethical refinement of an 
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initially very rough concept (containing many unnecessary human accretions) has not 
taken place. But the opposite seems to be the case. 
 The story of Abraham preparing to follow a "divine command" to slay his son 
Isaac (in Genesis), and then receiving an eleventh-hour reprieve from an angel as he is 
about to carry out the slaughter -- is a case-in-point.  Surely it is more reasonable to 
believe that Abraham, in an era in which religious practices included the sacrifice of 
children as an essential element (in Abraham's native Ur, sacrifice of the first-born was 
a frequent ritual in honor of the moon God, Sin), initially conceived of child-sacrifice as 
something he should also do for his God, but then came to his senses at the last 
minute, realized the ethical perversity of his act, but projected his newly-formed ethical 
insight onto an "angel" (in those days before the advent of what we call individual 
"conscience").  Or in a more traditional vein one could hold that an angel was actually 
sent to inculcate this important ethical insight into the "father of nations."  But to defend 
(as Kierkegaard does in Fear and Trembling) the notion of a God who, on the one hand, 
does not slaughter the innocent (and certainly not innocent heirs of the covenant), who 
does not "punish children for the sins of their parents" (Deuteronomy 24:16) and yet, on 
the other hand, commands slaughter of Abraham's innocent firstborn just to test 
Abraham's spiritual "mettle," evinces such a high degree of ethical ambiguity (especially 
in a situation where "everyone is doing it") that we would have to conclude that such 
religious inspirations are ethically retrogressive.2 
                                                 
     2This interpretation is developed in H. Kainz, Ethics in Context: Towards the Definition and 
Differentiation of the Morally Good (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1988), p. 
122. 
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 In other words, religious concepts can and must be subjected to ethical 
reexamination, they must pass "ethical muster" -- otherwise we end up with powerful 
and immensely dangerous "religious" incentives to terrorism, slavery, subjection of 
women, inquisitions, witch-burnings, holy wars and other abuses of religion peppering 
the history of the "Western world."  By "ethical reexamination" I do not mean "deferral to 
conscience," purely and simply, but the coordination of conscience and good intention 
with objective norms -- e.g. the "natural law," which, however nuanced it might be, 
would certainly include among its "thou-shalt-nots" a prohibition of child sacrifice. 
 2) A Deeper Understanding of "Chosenness": In the religious and ecclesiastical 
sphere we are confronted with a bewildering variety of claims to the effect that a certain 
group has been in some way specially "chosen" by God:  Not only Catholics, 
Protestants and Jews, but also Mormons, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Seventh Day 
Adventists have been known on occasion to present such a claim.  This is not the place 
to dispute or champion any such claims.  But let us presume that God did choose in a 
special way the Jews, who in any case have prima facie the longest-running claim on 
entitlement to "chosenness."  For what purpose would such election be?  Believers 
convinced that they are thus "chosen" would have to presume that they were not just 
singled out for privileges and preeminence and prerogatives, to the exclusion of others 
(otherwise God's wisdom in creating so many of the others might be seriously called 
into question).  The theological answer frequently given to the enigma of divine election 
is that God chose the Israelites, including the tribe of Judah, with a view to the 
preservation and spread of the true (monotheistic) concept of the divinity, and human 
responsibilities to the divinity.  This might entail certain privileges and special protection.  
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Nevertheless -- noblesse oblige; the privileges bring with them concomitant 
responsibilities, in this case propagation of the true monotheistic faith in the world at 
large.  This latter idea, of a mission to the world, was not initiated by Christianity with its 
"gospel," but is found well before Christianity in the psalms and prophetic books, in 
which Israel is depicted as being a light to the world, and in ecumenical fashion 
absorbing believers from all nations (see Isaiah 2:3-4, 49:6, 60:14; Psalms 87, 99, 102).  
Temporary or periodic isolation may conceivably be implied by chosenness, insofar as 
an intense introspective period of religious consolidation may be necessary as a 
preparation for a world mission.  But the end purpose of "chosenness" seems inimical to 
changeless self-identity and isolation.  The observation enunciated in the Christian 
gospel -- "unless the seed falling into the ground die, it itself will remain alone" -- seems 
to have a wider metaphorical applicability than just to Christianity. 
 3) The Untenableness of a Genocidal Military Strategy: At present we use the 
term "genocide" in an extremely pejorative sense, usually with reference to what is 
ambiguously called "state terrorism," e.g. Nazi Germany against the Jews, Iraq against 
the Kurds, Stalin's totalitarian purges of the Ukrainians, "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia.  
But genocide as part of religious-terrorist strategy is not mere extermination under the 
direction of a tyrant, but has the more nuanced sense of preemptive warfare:  We must 
visualize a situation in which an entire population perceives another entire population as 
bent not only on its total extermination but on the obliteration of its cultural and religious 
achievements (the other population may possibly also have the same perception).  In 
other words, it approximates a "kill or be killed" set of conditions between communities 
or nations rather than individuals.  In this context, there can be no effective and 
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meaningful differentiation of combatants from noncombatants.   Women and children 
and noncombatant men, as contributors or potential contributors (even through giving 
birth to future generations) to the overall strength of an absolutely perverse culture are 
potentially as threatening as actual combatants.  In the minds of a people threatened in 
this absolute manner, it is not just a question of using sufficient force just to defend 
oneself from this or that attack, but fighting for its continued existence by elimination of 
an uncompromising nemesis.  To be sure, one or both of the populations in question 
may be responsible for instigating this situation by their religious or ethnic exclusivism, 
prohibition of intermarriage and social interaction, differences in language and culture 
as well as moral diversities --  leading to ignorance of the other, suspicion, and a 
chronic anxiety requiring some suitable response.  But, whatever the initial incitements, 
at a certain point the fear and suspicion become so intense that the isolation or mutual 
isolation becomes irredeemable and irreparable; there is no turning back.  The kind of 
absolute hostility that we now call "genocide" becomes the "solution." 
 The unsatisfactory nature of this solution to perceived threats to the existence of 
a people may be obliquely pointed out if we examine the still classic analogous instance 
of the envisaged massive existence-threatening situation -- the nuclear-war strategy of 
"mutually assured destruction" (M.A.D.) adopted by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R in the 60s 
and now calling for some bewildering revisions:  It has always been clear to the man on 
the street that mutual nuclear annihilation is not a "solution" to the problem of defense.  
And it was certainly clear to strategists and moralists alike that to continue to threaten 
such suicidal destructiveness without in some way implementing the threats or even 
intending to implement them would lead to a lack of credibility, to say the least.  The 
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temporary, compromise way of seeming to "do something" was to build up gargantuan 
stockpiles of weaponry.  With huge reserves of overkill to insure their threat-credibility, 
each of the parties possessed a veritable "doomsday machine" which could conceivably 
bring about the obliteration of all life on earth.  And then even this arsenal was added to, 
or modernized, to make the madness complete.... 
 The parallel of the nuclear standoff with the patterns of terrorism we have 
considered helps to clarify the nature of terrorism: perhaps the threat of terror is largely 
a bluff, used to deter aggression, and advanced with the hope that it will never have to 
be used; still, any choice of a terrorist strategy, no matter how extreme the threat to 
communal existence may be, requires a continuance of terror; a dominant world power 
must both intend to do the terrible things that it boasts it is capable of, and augment ad 
infinitum its power to carry out its intentions, as well as (presumably, eventually) actually 
do, or almost do, terrible and unspeakable things to maintain the credibility of its 
announced intentions and its own reputation for toughness and inflexibility with regard 
to the enemy or enemies.  Such a contemporary counterpart of the "ban," even as a 
military strategy chosen as a last resort, is so suicidally self-defeating that it may 
ultimately leave no devotees to serve the God (or the "ideals of Western civilization" in a 
secularized version) for the sake of which the "ban"-like strategy was purportedly 
implemented. 4) Exclusivity itself as a Paradigmatic Danger: If genocidal intentions are 
suicidal, unconditional surrender could be equally suicidal.  Between the horns of this 
dilemma, a generally integrative strategy presents itself as a solution, and perhaps the 
only solution.  This is, of course, the strategy later adopted in the centuries in which the 
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Jewish diaspora prevailed, a unique mixture of ethnic-religious self-consciousness and 
adaptation to multiple social-national environments.  But if such a strategy developed 
among the ancient Israelites, it is largely ignored by the chroniclers.  There are cases 
recorded (see e.g. Judges 18:27) in which tribes or towns wanted to live in peaceful 
coexistence with the Hebrews, but were reportedly ruthlessly exterminated consistently 
with the strategy of the "ban." 
 The "ban" is and was a last-ditch instrument of security through elimination of 
external threats to an intentionally separated people.  But if separation was a viable 
means to preservation of the lives and culture and identity of a people in past eras, it no 
longer holds such promise.  In an era in which  "backpack" or "suitcase" nuclear bombs 
could be smuggled into areas where one embattled population lives in exclusivity, 
integration and intermingling, as well as social and intellectual interaction, with the 
"enemy" or potential enemy, is itself a strategy, even the strategy-of-choice -- a strategy 
fraught with danger, but entailing the most optimistic possibilities for national and 
international survival. CONCLUDING CONSIDERATIONS, SOME PLATONIC 
 
 It is a truism that religion has been a force in history bringing with it both great 
benefits and great dangers.  The conviction of having a direct relationship to God and 
being directly responsible only to Him, has been an important factor in the emancipation 
of men from autocratic oppression and social conformism; and the conviction of 
"chosenness" has impelled individuals and peoples to formidable moral achievements.  
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But these same convictions, as we know from history, can lead to extremes of 
destructiveness.  The Bible contains admirable incentives to the heights of morality, but 
also must be subjected to moral judgement. "Chosenness" is a distinctive idea in the 
Judaeo-Christian tradition which can unleash at its best great integrative forces, but at 
its worst fierce and intransigent contempt for, or indifference to, others.  Old Testament 
narratives extolling what we would now call "terrorist" activities -- even if they are not 
historically accurate -- proffer ideals which might easily be put into effect in history by 
believers and, in secularized form, by nonbelievers.  While scripture scholars may view 
prima facie acts of terrorism in the Old Testament as largely fictional accounts, of 
interest primarily for information provided about the development of religious and 
cultural consciousness of the Israelites, the religious person who approaches the 
scriptures for inspiration and guidance is listening to a "different drummer." 
 I will conclude with a reconsideration of the two themes in Plato discussed at the 
outset of this essay: 
 1) Platonic diffidence about the influence of poetry:   Plato's apparent vendetta 
against the poets may, as has already been indicated, be best understood as an 
attempt to install reason and philosophy in the place of the ambiguous potpourri of 
values found in the fictional accounts of the gods and heroes, as the major moral force 
in his time.  The fact that he gravitated towards an aristocratic censorship of literature by 
a political elite, is of course a byproduct of his distrust of the disorders associated with 
democracy, a form of government about which we moderns are more sanguine, just as 
we are more diffident about censorship.  But although Plato was unsuccessful in 
inspiring the adoption of his ideal state, as well as the censorship that would go with it, 
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his critique of the poets was a huge success, simply because it was a necessary 
element in the differentiation and signalization of philosophy as a distinct discipline, the 
acceptance of which had been impeded by the immense influence of the poets.  With 
philosophy in the ascendancy, people might be able to achieve, like Plato, a certain 
distance and objectivity about poetic narratives, and come to look on them, as we 
moderns do, as mere "fiction."   But while most moderns look upon epics and plays and 
novels as fiction, many do not view scriptural narratives, even terroristic narratives, in 
the same light.  Of course they have the assurance of the scripture scholars that 
accounts are to be understood only as very subjective expressions of the development 
of the faith-experience of imperfect and sinful creatures like you and me.  Good advice.  
But Plato's problem remains, this time perhaps to be solved not by philosophers but by 
theologians who can explain to the average person how a believer in a historically 
focused religion like Christianity can take incident after incident in Old and New 
Testament alike as nonhistorical but still important bases of a faith worth living and 
dying for. 
 2) Plato's critique of religious/moral norms:  The questions of homicide and 
genocide we have been considering seem morally unambiguous enough to allow most 
of us to come down squarely on the side of the Plato of the Euthyprho: such actions 
could not conceivably be pleasing to, or even commanded by, the sort of God 
conceptualized in our tradition; therefore the idealization of these actions should be 
pruned out of hand from one's religious value-system. However, for us to suggest like 
Plato in the Republic that inhumane ideals in writings with religious authoritativeness 
should be considered ipso facto nonauthoritative, and like Plato in the Euthyphro that 
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only morally right acts could be pleasing to God, does not necessarily entail the position 
that religion can say nothing autonomously about morality, or should even be subjected 
to moral censorship.  For there is still one sphere of morality left to religion, in which it 
can be both autonomous and authoritative without coming into conflict with morality: the 
sphere of the supererogatory (outside the parameters of what Kant called "strict 
duties").  This is a sphere transcending morality, insofar as it is concerned with going 
beyond justice to benevolence and beneficence, going beyond the duties to kinfolk and 
compatriots to yet other duties to strangers and even enemies, and in general going 
beyond the strict requirements of morality to adhere to still higher norms of love and 
beneficence. This is a sphere of action and endeavor which is adumbrated and 
inculcated in all major religions, and perhaps stands as the main moral contribution of 
religion to date.  In other words, the proper domain of religion is the further 
corroboration of already existent moral norms (as e.g. with the Ten Commandments) or 
incentives towards going beyond mere considerations of entitlement (as e.g. with 
ancient Hebrew laws for periodic forgiveness of debtors and periodic release of 
indentured servants).3 
 But morality has withal a certain autonomy and can, on occasion, stand in timely 
judgment over religion.  The terrorist who believes he is doing a service to God by his 
terrorism is not in need of a higher or more subtle degree of religious inspiration, but of 
a conscience; and the more religiously committed a person is, the more important it is 
                                                 
     3Cf. Ibid., p. 123. 
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that he or she take the clearly inhumane or immoral idealizations to be found in 
Scripture -- whether these be historical or fictional -- with the traditional "grain of salt."   
